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autonomy principally in tenns of the agent's conscious choice of ends or conduct. From this, the cognitivist emphasis on mental states and their contents naturally follows. The presence of specified mental states, as signifying agent choice, thus becomes the hallmark of responsible conduct. Capacities model theorists, by contrast, interpret personal autonomy and agent responsibility in tenns of the looser notion of 'control'. From this perspective, conscious choosing is but one (highly responsible) instance of such control, and the presence or absence of mental states is primarily relevant to detennining degrees of responsibility. The examination of these two models occupies the bulk of this manuscript. Exploration of the capacities model and criticism of the orthodox view also generate treatment of legal issues such as the use of negligence liability, the nature of criminal omissions, the character of various legal defenses, and so on. Chapters 2 and 3 set out some of the thematic arguments outlined above and introduce tenninology and useful distinctions. Chapters 4 through 7 provide substantive analyses of agent responsibility and of standards of criminal liability. In these chapters, I argue for the comparative superiority of the capacities model of responsibility and offer recommendations for changes in current legal conceptions and standards of liability. Each chapter centers on an element of individual responsibility and related legal concerns. The final chapter, Chapter 8, comprises an overview of the integrated theory of responsibility and liability and its comparison with the traditional view.

autonomy principally in tenns of the agent's conscious choice of ends or conduct. From this, the cognitivist emphasis on mental states and their contents naturally follows. The presence of specified mental states, as signifying agent choice, thus becomes the hallmark of responsible conduct. Capacities model theorists, by contrast, interpret personal autonomy and agent responsibility in tenns of the looser notion of 'control'. From this perspective, conscious choosing is but one (highly responsible) instance of such control, and the presence or absence of mental states is primarily relevant to detennining degrees of responsibility. The examination of these two models occupies the bulk of this manuscript. Exploration of the capacities model and criticism of the orthodox view also generate treatment of legal issues such as the use of negligence liability, the nature of criminal omissions, the character of various legal defenses, and so on. Chapters 2 and 3 set out some of the thematic arguments outlined above and introduce tenninology and useful distinctions. Chapters 4 through 7 provide substantive analyses of agent responsibility and of standards of criminal liability. In these chapters, I argue for the comparative superiority of the capacities model of responsibility and offer recommendations for changes in current legal conceptions and standards of liability. Each chapter centers on an element of individual responsibility and related legal concerns. The final chapter, Chapter 8, comprises an overview of the integrated theory of responsibility and liability and its comparison with the traditional view.

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1. Introduction.- 2. Responsibility and Criminal Law.- I. Law as Purposeful Activity.- II. Criminal Law and the Liberal Society.- III. The Two-Fold Aim.- IV. Responsibility.- IVA. Language and Terminology.- V. Two Models of Responsibility.- VA. Conditions of Imputative Responsibility.- 3. Law and Society.- I. Liability, Grading, and Allotment.- IA. Liability.- IB. Grading and Allotment.- II. Excuse, Justification, and Mitigation.- IIA. Excusing Devices and Subsystems.- III. Law and Society.- IIIA. Systems in Social Context.- 4. The Requirement of Conduct.- I. The Act Doctrine.- IA. The Rationale.- IB. Alternatives.- II. Definitions and Terminology.- IIA. Objections.- III. Omissions.- IIIA. Omissions as Conduct.- IIIB. Omissions in Criminal Law.- IV. Limitations of the Doctrine.- 5. Voluntariness.- I. Voluntariness and the Act Doctrine.- IA. Voluntariness and Mens Rea.- IB. Voluntariness and Causative Responsibility.- II. Involuntary and Nonvoluntary Conduct.- III. Objectivity and Subjectivity.- IV. Voluntariness and the Rationale of Excuses.- 6. Intentionality.- I. Intentionality.- II. Intentionality as Desire and Foresight.- III. Intentionality, Probabilities, and Purposes.- IIIA. Intentionality and Likelihood (The British View).- IIIB. Intentionality as Aiming.- IV. Import and Implications.- 7. Knowledge and Foresight.- I. Introduction.- II. Knowledge and Foresight.- IIA. Knowing.- IIB. Foresight.- III. Taking Risks.- IIIA. Justifiability.- IIIB. Degree.- IIIC. Reasonableness and Recklessness.- IV. Negligence.- IVA. Subjectivity, Objectivity, and the Nature of Negligence.- IVB. The Legitimacy of Negligence Liability.- IVC. The Structure and Limits of Criminal Negligence.- V. Exculpatory Mistakes.- 8. Responsibility and Conditional Liability.- I. Introduction.- II. Choice and Control.- III. Opportunities and Responsibility.- IV. Primary (Potency) Responsibility.- V. Prior Fault.- VI. Conclusion.- Reference Bibliography.- Table of Cases Cited or Consulted.

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