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In June 1994 the United States went to the brink of war with North Korea. With economic sanctions impending, President Bill Clinton approved the dispatch of substantial reinforcements to Korea, and plans were prepared for attacking the North's nuclear weapons complex. The turning point came in an extraordinary private diplomatic initiative by former President Jimmy Carter and others to reverse the dangerous American course and open the way to a diplomatic settlement of the nuclear crisis.


Few Americans know the full details behind this story or perhaps realize the devastating impact it could have had on the nation's post-Cold War foreign policy. In this lively and authoritative book, Leon Sigal offers an inside look at how the Korean nuclear crisis originated, escalated, and was ultimately defused. He begins by exploring a web of intelligence failures by the United States and intransigence within South Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Sigal pays particular attention to an American mindset that prefers coercion to cooperation in dealing with aggressive nations. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with policymakers from the countries involved, he discloses the details of the buildup to confrontation, American refusal to engage in diplomatic give-and-take, the Carter mission, and the diplomatic deal of October 1994.


In the post-Cold War era, the United States is less willing and able than before to expend unlimited resources abroad; as a result it will need to act less unilaterally and more in concert with other nations. What will become of an American foreign policy that prefers coercion when conciliation is more likely to serve its national interests? Using the events that nearly led the United States into a second Korean War, Sigal explores the need for policy change when it comes to addressing the challenge of nuclear proliferation and avoiding conflict with nations like Russia, Iran, and Iraq. What the Cuban missile crisis was to fifty years of superpower conflict, the North Korean nuclear crisis is to the coming era.

정보제공 :

CONTENTS

PREFACE = ⅸ

ABBREVIATIONS = xiii

1 Uncooperative America = 3

 A History of Failure = 5

 Shared Uncertainty, Shared Certitude = 10

 The Politics of Diplomatic Paralysis = 13

PART Ⅰ: COERCION FAILS = 15

 2 The Bush Deadlock Machine = 17

  Dealing with Korean Insecurities = 20

  North Korea Reciprocates for U.S. Security Assurances = 25

  "One Meeting Means One Meeting" = 32

  Ignoring the North's Offer = 38

  Witnesses for the Prosecution = 42

  Interregnum Politics: No One Stands Up to Team Spirit = 44

 3 The Clinton Administration Ties Itself in Knots = 52

  Coaxing North Korea Partway Back into the Treaty = 55

  The Reactor Deal Redux = 65

  Empty, Threats = 71

  An Empty "Package Deal" = 77

  Seoul Gets the Shakes = 84

 4 A "Better than Even" Chance of Misestimation = 90

  The Collapse of 'Super Tuesday" = 95

  Let Bygones Be Bygones, for Now = 108

  Stumbling to the Brink = 113

 5 Deadlock 1= 24

PART Ⅱ COOPERATION SUCCEEDS = 129

 6 Open Covenants, Privately Arrived At = 131

  Private Contacts with Pyongyang = 133

  Pyongyang Reaches Out = 137

  The Hidden Hand in the First joint Statement = 140

  Two Foundations Try to jump-Start Diplomacy = 143

  Jimmy Carter Refuses to Take "No"for an Answer = 150

  The Carter-Kim Deal = 155

  The Bushmen Go on the Warpath = 162

 7 Getting to Yes = 168

  Kim Il Sung's Legacy = 172

  Putting Some Chips on the Table = 176

  The October Agreed Framework = 184

  Decrying and Defending the Deal = 192

  The Issue at Kuala Lumpur: What's in a Name? = 199

PART Ⅲ: CONCLUSIONS = 205

 8 Nuclear Diplomacy in the News-An Untold Story = 207

  Unfamiliarity Breeds Contempt = 208

  Explaining News on Nuclear Diplomacy = 219

  Op-eds and Editorials = 223

  Possible Consequences of News Coverage = 225

 9 The Politics of Discouragement = 229

  No Interest in a Deal = 229

  The Foreign Policy Establishment = 236

 10 Why Won't America Cooperate? = 244

  Realism = 246

  The Liberal Challenge to Realism = 250

  Cooperating with Strangers = 251

Appendixes = 255

Appendix Ⅰ North Korea's Tit-for-Tat Negotiating Behavior = 257

Appendix Ⅱ Key Documents = 260

Notes = 265

INDEX = 307