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| 005 | 20030404143722 | |
| 008 | 010302s2001 enk b 001 0 eng | |
| 010 | ▼a 1025544 | |
| 020 | ▼a 0521791022 | |
| 040 | ▼a DLC ▼c DLC ▼d UKM ▼d 211009 | |
| 042 | ▼a pcc | |
| 049 | 1 | ▼l 111229872 |
| 050 | 0 0 | ▼a HB846.8 ▼b .G34 2001 |
| 082 | 0 0 | ▼a 302/.13 ▼2 21 |
| 090 | ▼a 302.13 ▼b G128d | |
| 100 | 1 | ▼a Gaertner, Wulf. |
| 245 | 1 0 | ▼a Domain conditions in social choice theory / ▼c Wulf Gaertner. |
| 260 | ▼a Cambridge, UK ; ▼a New York : ▼b Cambridge University Press, ▼c 2001. | |
| 300 | ▼a ix, 153 p. ; ▼c 23 cm. | |
| 504 | ▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. 131-145) and index. | |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Social choice ▼x Mathematical models. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Decision making ▼x Mathematical models. |
소장정보
| No. | 소장처 | 청구기호 | 등록번호 | 도서상태 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. 1 | 소장처 중앙도서관/서고6층/ | 청구기호 302.13 G128d | 등록번호 111229872 (1회 대출) | 도서상태 대출가능 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
컨텐츠정보
책소개
Wulf Gaertner provides a comprehensive account of an important and complex issue within social choice theory: how to establish a social welfare function while restricting the spectrum of individual preferences in a sensible way. Gaertner's starting point is K. J. Arrow's famous 'Impossibility Theorem', which showed that no welfare function could exist if an unrestricted domain of preferences is to be satisfied together with some other appealing conditions. A number of leading economists have tried to provide avenues out of this 'impossibility' by restricting the variety of preferences: here, Gaertner provides a clear and detailed account, using standardized mathematical notation, of well over forty theorems associated with domain conditions. Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory will be an essential addition to the library of social choice theory for scholars and their advanced graduate students.
A most comprehensive survey of recent research in an important area of social choice theory.
정보제공 :
목차
Preface and acknowledgements; 1. Introduction; 2. Notation, definitions and two fundamental theorems; 3. The existence of collective choice rules under exclusion conditions for finite sets of discrete alternatives; 4. Arrovian social welfare functions, nonmanipulable voting procedures and stable group decision functions; 5. Restrictions on the distribution of individuals' preferences; 6. The existence of social choice rules in n-dimensional continuous space; 7. Concluding remarks; 8. References; Indexes.
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