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| 001 | 000046097541 | |
| 005 | 20211109112141 | |
| 008 | 211108s2019 nyu b 001 0 eng c | |
| 010 | ▼a 2018019813 | |
| 020 | ▼a 9780190469733 (vol. 1 : hardcover : alk. paper) | |
| 020 | ▼a 9780190469771 (vol. 2 : hardcover : alk. paper) | |
| 020 | ▼a 9780190469740 (vol.1 : UPDF) | |
| 020 | ▼a 9780190469788 (vol.2 : UPDF) | |
| 020 | ▼a 9780190469757 (vol.1 : EPUB) | |
| 020 | ▼a 9780190469795 (vol.2 : EPUB) | |
| 035 | ▼a (KERIS)REF000018830861 | |
| 040 | ▼a LBSOR/DLC ▼b eng ▼e rda ▼c LBSOR ▼d 211009 | |
| 042 | ▼a pcc | |
| 050 | 0 0 | ▼a HB846.8 ▼b .O84 2019 |
| 082 | 0 0 | ▼a 302/.13 ▼2 23 |
| 084 | ▼a 302.13 ▼2 DDCK | |
| 090 | ▼a 302.13 ▼b O98 | |
| 245 | 0 4 | ▼a The Oxford handbook of public choice / ▼c edited by Roger D. Congleton, Bernard Grofman, and Stefan Voigt. |
| 260 | ▼a New York : ▼b Oxford University Press, ▼c c2019. | |
| 264 | 1 | ▼a New York, NY : ▼b Oxford University Press, ▼c [2019] |
| 300 | ▼a 2 v. ; ▼c 26 cm. | |
| 336 | ▼a text ▼b txt ▼2 rdacontent | |
| 337 | ▼a unmediated ▼b n ▼2 rdamedia | |
| 338 | ▼a volume ▼b nc ▼2 rdacarrier | |
| 504 | ▼a Includes bibliographical references and index. | |
| 505 | 0 | ▼a Volume 1. Rational choice and politics: an introduction to the research program and methodology of public choice / Roger D. Congleton -- Choosing among governments / Alan Hamlin -- Public choice: early contributions / Dennis C. Mueller -- From paired comparisons and cycles to arrow's theorem / Donald G. Saari -- Institution-induced stability / Kenneth A. Shepsle -- Voting power / Stefan Napel -- Aggregation of information by binary voting rules / Shmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush -- Political choices in one dimension: theory / Bernard Grofman -- Political choices in one dimension: applications / Bernard Grofman -- Spatial voting models of party competition in two dimensions / James F. Adams -- Spatial social choice / Norman Schofield -- Economic voting / Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier -- Valence politics / Haldun Evrenk -- The study of strategic voting / André Blais and Arianna Degan -- Turnout: why do voters vote? / Serguei Kaniovski -- Expressive voting / Alan Hamlin and Colin Jennings -- Altruism and political participation / Richard Jankowski -- Social embeddedness and rational turnout / Carole Jean Uhlaner -- Information cues and rational ignorance / Shaun Bowler and Stephen P. Nicholson -- Manipulation / Charles R. Plott -- Campaign finance / Thomas Stratmann -- Primaries, conventions, and other methods for nominating candidates: how do they matter? / Gilles Serra -- Logrolling and coalitions / Anthony J. McGann -- Collective action / Jac C. Heckelman -- Rent seeking: the social cost of contestable benefits / Arye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long -- The structure of contests and the extent of dissipation / Karl Wärneryd -- The political economy of rent creation and rent extraction / Roger D. Congleton -- Empirical evidence on rent seeking costs / Ignacio Del Rosal -- "The bureaucracy" as an interest group / Patrick Dunleavy -- Interest groups and regulatory capture / William F. Shughart II and Diana W. Thomas -- Corruption / Toke Aidt -- The political economy of trust / Christian Bjørnskov -- Contested political persuasion / Stergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya -- Stochastic process models of preference change / Michel Regenwetter and Yung-Fong Hsu -- Leadership as persuasion / Benjamin E. Hermalin -- Fairness concepts / Christian Klamler -- Social contract vs. invisible hand: agreeing to solve social dilemmas / Viktor J. Vanberg -- Utilitarianism as a criterion for state action / Nicolaus Tideman and Florenz Plassmann -- Public choice and happiness / Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer -- Kantianism and political institutions / Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt -- Public choice and libertarianism / Peter J. Boettke and Ennio E. Piano -- Public choice and social democracy / Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard -- Supreme values, totalitarianism and terrorism / Peter Bernholz -- Fair division in dispute resolution / Steven J. Brams -- Fair division in allocating cabinet ministries / Steven J. Brams. |
| 505 | 8 | ▼a Volume 2. How should votes be cast and counted? / Nicolaus Tideman -- Voters and representatives: how should representatives be selected? / Thomas Braendle and Alois Stutzer -- Divided government: the king and the council / George Tridimas -- Bicameralism / Cecilia Testa -- Federalism / Jaroslaw Kantorowicz -- Executive veto power and constitutional design / Nicholas R. Miller -- Politics and the legal system / Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal -- Constitutional review / Nuno Garoupa -- Institutions for amending constitutions / Cristina Bucur and Bjørn Erik Rasch -- Constitutional transition / Zachary Elkins -- Electoral systems in the making / Daniel Bochsler -- Choosing voting rules in the European Union / Bela Plechanovová, Madeleine O. Hosli and Anatolij Plechanov -- Leviathan, taxation, and public goods / Martin C. McGuire -- Fiscal powers revisited: the leviathan model after 40 years / Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt -- Are there types of dictatorship? / Ronald Wintrobe -- Are there really dictatorships? the selectorate and authoritarian governance / Alejandro Quiroz Flores -- The coup: competition for office in authoritarian regimes / Toke Aidt and Gabriel Leon -- The logic of revolutions: rational choice perspectives / Timur Kuran and Diego Romero -- Direct democracy and public policy / John G. Matsusaka -- Policy differences among parliamentary and presidential systems / Sebastian M. Saiegh -- The significance of political parties / Michael Munger -- The least dangerous branch? public choice, constitutional courts, and democratic governance / Georg Vanberg -- Challenges in estimating the effects of constitutional design on public policy / Stefan Voigt and Jerg Gutmann -- The political economy of taxation: power, structure, redistribution / Stanley L. Winer -- The politics of central bank independence / Jakob de Haan and Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger -- The political economy of redistribution policy / Luna Bellani and Heinrich Ursprung -- Political participation and the welfare / Rainald Borck -- Institutions for solving commons problems: lessons and implications for institutional design / Paul Dragos Aligica and Michael E. Cox -- Rational ignorance and public choice / Ilya Somin -- Is government growth inevitable? / Randall G. Holcombe -- The political economy of international organizations / Axel Dreher and Valentin F. Lang -- The politics of international trade / Wilfred J. Ethier and Arye L. Hillman -- Politics, direct investment, public debt markets and the shadow economy: what do we (not) know? / Friedrich Schneider -- The politics of international aid / Hristos Doucouliagos -- Is democracy exportable? / Pierre Salmon -- Ancient Greece: democracy and autocracy / Robert K. Fleck and F. Andrew Hanssen -- Christian history and public choice / Mario Ferrero -- Voting at the u.s. constitutional convention / Keith L. Dougherty -- Precursors to public choice / Iain McLean -- Estimates of the spatial voting model / Christopher Hare and Keith T. Poole -- The dimensionality of parliamentary voting / Keith T. Poole -- Voting and popularity / Gebhard Kirchgässner -- Detection of election fraud / Susumu Shikano and Verena Mack -- Experimental public choice: elections / Aaron Kamm and Arthur Schram -- Experimental evidence on expressive voting / Jean-Robert Tyran and Alexander K. Wagner. |
| 520 | ▼a "This two-volume collection provides a comprehensive overview of the past seventy years of public choice research, written by experts in the fields surveyed. The individual chapters are more than simple surveys, but provide readers with both a sense of the progress made and puzzles that remain. Most are written with upper level undergraduate and graduate students in economics and political science in mind, but many are completely accessible to non-expert readers who are interested in Public Choice research. The two-volume set will be of broad interest to social scientists, policy analysts, and historians"-- ▼c Provided by publisher. | |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Social choice. |
| 700 | 1 | ▼a Congleton, Roger D., ▼e editor. |
| 700 | 1 | ▼a Grofman, Bernard, ▼e editor. |
| 700 | 1 | ▼a Voigt, Stefan, ▼e editor. |
| 945 | ▼a KLPA |
소장정보
| No. | 소장처 | 청구기호 | 등록번호 | 도서상태 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. 1 | 소장처 중앙도서관/서고6층/ | 청구기호 302.13 O98 1 | 등록번호 111854657 (1회 대출) | 도서상태 대출가능 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
컨텐츠정보
책소개
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems.
The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems as well as the influence of different institutional frameworks on incentives and outcomes. The result is an improved understanding of public policy, public finance, industrial organization, and macroeconomics as the
combination of political and economic analysis shed light on how various interests compete both within a given rules of the games and, at times, to change the rules. These volumes include analytical surveys, syntheses, and general overviews of the many subfields of public choice focusing on interesting, important, and
at times contentious issues. Throughout the focus is on enhancing understanding how political and economic systems act and interact, and how they might be improved.
Both volumes combine methodological analysis with substantive overviews of key topics. This first volume covers voting and elections; interest group competition and rent seeking, including corruption and various normative approaches to evaluating policies and politics.
Throughout both volumes important analytical concepts and tools are discussed, including their application to substantive topics. Readers will gain increased understanding of rational choice and its implications for collective action; various explanations of voting, including economic and expressive; the role of taxation and finance in government dynamics; how trust and persuasion influence political outcomes; and how revolution, coups, and authoritarianism can be explained by the same set of
analytical tools as enhance understanding of the various forms of democracy.
정보제공 :
목차
PART I: Introductory Essays 1. Rational Choice and Politics: An Introduction to the Research Program and Methodology of Public Choice Roger D. Congleton 2. Choosing among Governments Alan Hamlin 3. Public Choice: Early Contributions Dennis C. Mueller PART II: VOTING AND ELECTIONS A. Modelling Collective Choice in Voting 4. From Paired Comparisons and Cycles to Arrow''s Theorem Donald G. Saari 5. Institution-induced Stability Kenneth A. Shepsle 6. Voting Power Stefan Napel 7. Aggregation of Information by Binary Voting Rules Shmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush B. Spatial Voting Models 8. Political Choices in One Dimension: Theory Bernard Grofman 9. Political Choices in One Dimension: Applications Bernard Grofman 10. Spatial Voting Models of Party Competition in Two Dimensions James F. Adams 11. Spatial Social Choice Norman Schofield C. Other Aspects of Voter and Party Choice 12. Economic Voting Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier 13. Valence Politics Haldun Evrenk 14. The Study of Strategic Voting Andre Blais and Arianna Degan 15. Turnout: Why do voters vote? Serguei Kaniovski 16. Expressive Voting Alan Hamlin and Colin Jennings 17. Altruism and Political Participation Richard Jankowski 18. Social Embeddedness and Rational Turnout Carole Jean Uhlaner 19. Information cues and rational ignorance Shaun Bowler and Stephen P. Nicholson 20. Manipulation Charles R. Plott D. Democracy in Practice 21. Campaign Finance Thomas Stratmann 22. Primaries, conventions, and other methods for nominating candidates: How do they matter? Gilles Serra 23. Logrolling and Coalitions Anthony J. McGann PART III: INTEREST GROUP POLITICS AND RENT SEEKING A. Interest Group Politics 24. Collective Action Jac C. Heckelman 25. Rent seeking: The social cost of contestable benefits Arye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long 26. The Structure of Contests and the Extent of Dissipation Karl Warneryd 27. The Political Economy of Rent Creation and Rent Extraction Roger D. Congleton 28. Empirical evidence on rent seeking costs Ignacio Del Rosal B. Political Agency Problems and Trust in Government 29. ''The Bureaucracy'' as an Interest Group Patrick Dunleavy 30. Interest Groups and Regulatory Capture William F. Shughart II and Diana W. Thomas 31. Corruption Toke Aidt 32. The Political Economy of Trust Christian Bjornskov C. Persuasion 33. Contested Political Persuasion Stergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya 34. Stochastic Process Models of Preference Change Michel Regenwetter and Yung-Fong Hsu 35. Leadership as Persuasion Benjamin E. Hermalin PART IV: NORMATIVE POLITICAL THEORY: EVALUATING POLICIES AND POLITIES 36. Fairness Concepts Christian Klamler 37. Social Contract vs. Invisible Hand: Agreeing to Solve Social Dilemmas Viktor J. Vanberg 38. Utilitarianism as a Criterion for State Action Nicolaus Tideman and Florenz Plassmann 39. Public Choice and Happiness Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer 40. Kantianism and Political Institutions Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt 41. Public choice and libertarianism Peter J. Boettke and Ennio E. Piano 42. Public choice and social democracy Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard 43. Supreme Values, Totalitarianism and Terrorism Peter Bernholz 44. Fair Division in Dispute Resolution Steven J. Brams 45. Fair Division in Allocating Cabinet Ministries Steven J. Brams