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This major reference collection presents in three volumes the key articles and papers on social choice theory. Volume one centres attention on key aspects of the debate on Arrow's impossibility theorem, carefully counter-poising differing viewpoints and embracing competing methodologies. In a field prone to the excessive use of mathematics and of arcane high theory, Charles Rowley skilfully presents a literature which is accessible to non-mathematicians and yet which offers full coverage of all the major debates. Volumes two and three extend the coverage of social choice theory to review the attempts of leading scholars to resolve the ageless problems of determining social goals and reconciling apparent inconsistencies among such goals. Professor Rowley carefully guides the reader through a litancy of approaches, both methodological individualist and social engineering, ends-related and process-related in nature. Volume two reprints leading contributions to the utilitarian and contractarian ethics while volume three completes this exercise with material on the social justice and contractarian ethics. Professor Rowley's own introductory essay exposes the social choice research programme to his own Virginian critique, while integrating a large, diffuse literature into a unified whole.

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CONTENTS
Acknowledgements = ⅸ
Introduction = xi
PART I FOUNDATIONS
 1. 'A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economies'. Quarterly Journal of Economics, LII, 310-34 / Abram Bergson (1938) = 3
 2. 'The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LVIII (1), November, 27-48 / Howard R. Bowen (1943) = 28
 3. 'On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making', Journal of Political Economy, LVI, 23-34 / Duncan Black (1948) = 50
 4. 'A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare', Journal of Political Economy, LVIII, 328-46 / Kenneth J. Arrow (1950) = 62
PART II COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY, VOTING AND STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
 5. 'Social Choice and Individual Values', Journal of Political Economy, LX, 422-32 / I.M.D. Little (1952) = 83
 6. 'The Existence of Social Welfare Functions', Econometrica, 25, 302-13 / Julian H. Blau (1957) = 94
 7. 'Rational Choice Functions and Orderings', Economica, New Series, XXVI (102), May, 121-7 / Kenneth J. Arrow (1959) = 106
 8. 'On Making a Recommendation in a Democracy", Economic Journal, LXXII, June, 293-8 / J. de V. Graaff (1962) = 113
 9. 'The Irrationality of Intransitivity', Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, 16, 401-6 / Gordon Tullock (1964) = 119
 10. 'A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions', Econometrica, 34 (2), April, 491-9 / Amartya K. Sen (1966) = 125
 11. 'The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem', Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXI, 256-70 / Gordon Tullock (1967) = 134
 12. 'Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Rational Choice Under Majority Decision', Journal of Economic Theory, 1, 178-202 / Amartya Sen ; Prasanta K. Pattanaik (1969) = 149
 13. 'Tullock and an Existence Theorem', Public Choice, VI, 105-11 / Kenneth J. Arrow (1969) = 174
 14. 'Values and Collective Decision-Making', in P. Laslett and W.G. Runcimann (eds), Philosophy, Politics and Society, 3rd Series, New York: Barnes and Noble, 215-32 / Kenneth J. Arrow (1967) = 181
 15. 'Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result', Econometrica, 41 (4), July, 587-601 / Allan Gibbard (1973) = 199
 16. 'Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice', Econometrica, 41 (6), November, 1075-91 / Charles R. Plott (1973) = 214
 17. 'Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation', American Journal of Political Science, XX (3), August, 511-96 / Charles R. Plott (1976) = 231
 18. 'Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions', Journal of Economic Theory, 10, 187-217 / Mark Allen Satterthwaite (1975) = 317
 19. 'Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination', Econometrica, 45 (1), January, 53-89 / Amartya Sen (1977) = 348
PART III CRITIQUES OF 'SOCIAL CHOICE AS SOCIAL ENGINEERING'
 20. 'The Treatment of "Irrationality" in the Social Sciences', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, IV (4), June, 527-45 / Ludwig von Mises (1944) = 387
 21. 'The Use of Knowledge in Society', American Economic Review, XXXV (4), September, 519-30 / F.A. Hayek (1945) = 406
 22. "Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets', Journal of Political Economy, LXII, 114-23 / James M. Buchanan (1954) = 418
 23. 'Individual Choice in Voting and the Market', Journal of Political Economy, LXII, 334-43 / James M. Buchanan (1954) = 428
 24. 'What Should Economists Do?', Southern Economic Journal, XXX (3), January, 213-22 / James M. Buchanan (1964) = 438
 25. 'Social Choice and Individual Liberty', in M.J. Artis and A.R. Nobay (eds), Contemporary Economic Analysis, London: Croom Helm, 243-67 / Robert Sugden (1978) = 448
 26. 'Liberty as Control: An Appraisal', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 7, 207-21 / Amartya Sen (1982) = 473
PART IV ATTEMPTS TO ESCAPE FROM THE SOCIAL CHOICE DIFFICULTY
 27. 'Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility', Journal of Political Economy, LXffl, 309-21 / John C. Harsanyi (1955) = 491
 28. 'Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem', Econometrica, 45 (4), May, 783-809 / Theodore Groves ; John Ledyard (1977) = 504
 29. 'A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices', Journal of Political Economy, 84, 1145-59 / T. Nicolaus Tideman ; Gordon Tullock (1976) = 531
 30. 'Is "a New and Superior Process" Really Superior?', Journal of Political Economy, 87 (4), 875-90 / William H. Riker (1979) = 546
 31. 'On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis', Econometrica, 45 (7), October, 1539-72 / Amartya Sen (1977) = 562
Name Index = 597