| 000 | 01287camuu2200337 a 4500 | |
| 001 | 000045159797 | |
| 005 | 20050323141147 | |
| 008 | 990211s2000 enka b 001 0 eng | |
| 010 | ▼a 99012886 | |
| 020 | ▼a 052162391X (hb) | |
| 020 | ▼a 0521625505 (pb) | |
| 035 | ▼a KRIC08210890 | |
| 040 | ▼a 241008 ▼c 241008 ▼d 211046 ▼d 211009 | |
| 042 | ▼a pcc | |
| 043 | ▼a n-us--- | |
| 050 | 0 0 | ▼a JK586 ▼b .C23 2000 |
| 082 | 0 4 | ▼a 352.23 ▼2 21 |
| 090 | ▼a 352.23 ▼b C182v | |
| 100 | 1 | ▼a Cameron, Charles M. ▼q (Charles Metz), ▼d 1954-. |
| 245 | 1 0 | ▼a Veto bargaining : ▼b presidents and the politics of negative power / ▼c Charles M. Cameron. |
| 260 | ▼a Cambridge, UK ; ▼a New York : ▼b Cambridge University Press, ▼c 2000. | |
| 300 | ▼a xvi, 292 p. : ▼b ill. ; ▼c 24 cm. | |
| 440 | 0 | ▼a Political economy of institutions and decisions |
| 504 | ▼a Includes bibliographical references. | |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Veto ▼z United States. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Presidents ▼z United States. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Executive power ▼z United States. |
| 651 | 0 | ▼a United States ▼x Politics and government ▼y 1945-1989. |
| 651 | 0 | ▼a United States ▼x Politics and government ▼y 1989- |
소장정보
| No. | 소장처 | 청구기호 | 등록번호 | 도서상태 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. 1 | 소장처 중앙도서관/서고6층/ | 청구기호 352.23 C182v | 등록번호 111314081 (6회 대출) | 도서상태 대출가능 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
컨텐츠정보
책소개
The late-twentieth century has given rise to the most concentrated period of divided party government in American history. With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining offers a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government.
Combining game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party Presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile congress.
정보제공 :
목차
CONTENTS List of Tables and Figures = x Preface = xiii 1 Divided Government and Interbranch Bargaining = 1 2 A Natural History of Veto Bargaining, 1945-1992 = 33 3 Rational Choice and the Presidency = 69 4 Models of Veto Bargaining = 83 5 Explaining the Patterns = 123 6 Testing the Models = 152 7 Veto Threats = 178 8 Interpreting History = 203 9 Conclusion = 247 References = 271 Index = 285