| 000 | 00000cam u2200205 a 4500 | |
| 001 | 000045840248 | |
| 005 | 20150807105419 | |
| 008 | 150806s2013 nyu b 001 0 eng d | |
| 010 | ▼a 2012029713 | |
| 020 | ▼a 9781107026728 (hbk.) | |
| 020 | ▼a 9781107538122 (pbk.) | |
| 035 | ▼a (KERIS)REF000016918456 | |
| 040 | ▼a DLC ▼c DLC ▼d DLC ▼d 211009 | |
| 050 | 0 0 | ▼a BJ1521 ▼b .A44 2013 |
| 082 | 0 0 | ▼a 179/.9 ▼2 23 |
| 084 | ▼a 179.9 ▼2 DDCK | |
| 090 | ▼a 179.9 ▼b A385c | |
| 100 | 1 | ▼a Alfano, Mark, ▼d 1983-. |
| 245 | 1 0 | ▼a Character as moral fiction / ▼c Mark Alfano. |
| 260 | ▼a New York : ▼b Cambridge University Press, ▼c 2013. | |
| 300 | ▼a ix, 226 p. ; ▼c 23 cm. | |
| 504 | ▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. 206-224) and index. | |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Character. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Virtue. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Normativity (Ethics). |
| 945 | ▼a KLPA |
소장정보
| No. | 소장처 | 청구기호 | 등록번호 | 도서상태 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. 1 | 소장처 중앙도서관/서고6층/ | 청구기호 179.9 A385c | 등록번호 111740005 (4회 대출) | 도서상태 대출가능 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
컨텐츠정보
책소개
Everyone wants to be virtuous, but recent psychological investigations suggest that this may not be possible. Mark Alfano challenges this theory and asks, not whether character is empirically adequate, but what characters human beings could have and develop. Although psychology suggests that most people do not have robust character traits such as courage, honesty and open-mindedness, Alfano argues that we have reason to attribute these virtues to people because such attributions function as self-fulfilling prophecies - children become more studious if they are told that they are hard-working and adults become more generous if they are told that they are generous. He argues that we should think of virtue and character as social constructs: there is no such thing as virtue without social reinforcement. His original and provocative book will interest a wide range of readers in contemporary ethics, epistemology, moral psychology and empirically informed philosophy.
This provocative contribution to ethics and epistemology argues that virtue attributions are self-fulfilling prophecies.
정보제공 :
목차
Introduction: Tripartite naturalistic ethics; Part I. Factitious Moral Virtue: 1. Identifying the hard core of virtue ethics; 2. Rearticulating the situationist challenge to virtue ethics; 3. Attempts to defend virtue ethics; 4. Factitious moral virtue; Part II. Factitious Intellectual Virtue: 5. Extending the situationist challenge to responsibilist virtue epistemology; 6. Extending the situationist challenge to reliabilist virtue epistemology; 7. Factitious intellectual virtue; Part III. Programmatic Conclusion: 8. To see as we are seen: an investigation of social distance heuristics.
정보제공 :
