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Game Theory for Economists introduces economists to the game-theoretic approach of modelling economic behaviour and interaction, focusing on concepts and ideas from the vast field of game-theoretic models which find commonly used applications in economics.
This careful selection of topics allows the reader to concentrate on the parts of the game which are the most relevant for the economist who does not want to become a specialist. Written at a level appropriate for a student or researcher with a solid microeconomic background, the book should provide the reader with skills necessary to formalize economic games and to make them accessible for game theoretic analysis.

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* Is a concise introduction to game theory which provides economists with the techniques and results necessary to follow the literature in economic theory.
* Helps the reader formalize economic problems.
* Concentrates on equilibrium concepts that are most commonly used in economics.

정보제공 :

CONTENTS
Preface = xi
1 Formal Representations of Games
 1.1 Games in Extensive Form = 2
  1.1.1 The Game Tree = 2
  1.1.2 A First Result : Chess and Zermelo's Theorem = 9
  1.1.3 Information Sets = 11
  1.1.4 What Do Players Know about a Game? = 16
 1.2 Concepts of Strategies = 17
  1.2.1 Pure Strategies = 17
  1.2.2 Mixed Strategies = 19
  1.2.3 Behavior Strategies = 22
  1.2.4 Behavior Strategies versus Mixed Strategies = 24
 1.3 Games in Strategic Form = 27
 1.4 Cooperative and Noncooperative Games = 31
 1.5 Games in Coalitional Form = 34
 1.6 Summary = 35
 1.7 Remarks on the Literature = 36
 Exercises = 37
2 Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
 2.1 What Is a Solution to a Game? = 42
  2.1.1 The Value of a Game = 43
  2.1.2 Equilibrium of a Game = 46
 2.2 Relationship of Equilibrium and Value = 49
 2.3 Mixed Strategies = 51
 2.4 Summary = 58
 2.5 Remarks on the Literature = 59
 Exercises = 59
3 Equilibrium Concepts Ⅰ : Dominance Arguments
 3.1 Dominant Strategy Equilibrium = 65
 3.2 Iterated Dominance Equilibrium = 72
 3.3 Summary = 80
 3.4 Remarks on the Literature = 80
 Exercises = 81
4 Equilibrium Concepts Ⅱ I : Nash Equilibrium
 4.1 Existence of Nash Equilibrium = 87
 4.2 Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium = 102
 4.3 Two Interpretations of the Nash Equilibrium Concept = 107
 4.4 Perfect Equilibrium = 110
 4.5 Summary = 117
 4.6 Remarks on the Literature = 118
 Exercises = 118
5 Games with Incomplete Information
 5.1 Bayesian Decision Theory = 128
 5.2 Bayes-Nash Equilibrium = 132
 5.3 Bayes-Nash Equilibrium : Two Alternative Views = 137
  5.3.1 Games of Incomplete Information as Games with Expanded Player Sets = 137
  5.3.2 Games of Incomplete Information as Extensive Form Games = 138
 5.4 Infinite Type Sets = 140
 5.5 Mixed Strategies as Bayes-Nash Equilibrium Decision Functions = 144
 5.6 Summary = 148
 5.7 Remarks on the Literature = 149
 Exercises = 150
6 Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept : Backward Induction
 6.1 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium = 157
 6.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium = 165
 6.3 Sequential Equilibrium and Agent Normal Form Perfection = 171
 6.4 Summary = 177
 6.5 Remarks on the Literature = 178
 Excercise = 179
7 Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept : Forward Induction
 7.1 Signalling Games = 185
 7.2 Stable Equilibria = 197
 7.3 Summary = 200
 7.4 Remarks on the Literature = 201
 Exercises = 202
8 Repeated Games and Folk Theorems
 8.1 The Formal Description of a Repeated Game = 208
 8.2 Repeated Games with an Infinite Horizon = 213
  8.2.1 Nash Equilibria = 216
  8.2.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibria = 220
 8.3 Repeated Games with a Finite Horizon = 224
 8.4 Summary = 228
 8.5 Remarks on the Literature = 229
 Exercises = 229
9 Bargaining Theory
 9.1 The Noncooperative Approach : Bargaining Procedures = 239
 9.2 The Cooperative Approach : Desirable Properties of Outcomes = 249
 9.3 The Nash Program = 260
 9.4 Summary = 263
 9.5 Remarks on the Literature = 264
 Exercises = 264
10 Cooperative Games
 10.1 The Core = 274
 10.2 The Shapley Value = 287
 10.3 Summary = 298
 10.4 Remarks on the Literature = 299
 Exercises = 300
Bibliography = 303
Index = 309