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Many instructors of microeconomic theory have been waiting for a text that provides balanced and in-depth analysis of the essentials of microeconomics. Masterfully combining the results of years of teaching microeconomics at Harvard University, Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry
Green have filled that conspicuous vacancy with their groundbreaking text, Microeconomic Theory.
The authors set out to create a solid organizational foundation upon which to build the effective teaching tool for microeconomic theory. The result presents unprecedented depth of coverage in all the essential topics, while allowing professors to "tailor-make" their course to suit personal
priorities and style. Topics such as noncooperative game theory, information economics, mechanism design, and general equilibrium under uncertainty receive the attention that reflects their stature within the discipline. The authors devote an entire section to game theory alone, making it
"free-standing" to allow instructors to return to it throughout the course when convenient. Discussion is clear, accessible, and engaging, enabling the student to gradually acquire confidence as well as proficiency. Extensive exercises within each chapter help students to hone their skills, while
the text's appendix of terms, fully cross-referenced throughout the previous five sections, offers an accessible guide to the subject matter's terminology. Teachers of microeconomics need no longer rely upon scattered lecture notes to supplement their textbooks. Deftly written by three of the
field's most influential scholars, Microeconomic Theory brings the readability, comprehensiveness, and versatility to the first-year graduate classroom that has long been missing.

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CONTENTS

Preface = xiii

PART ONE : INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING = 3

Chapter 1. Preference and Choice = 5

 1.A Introduction = 5

 1.B Preference Relations = 6

 1.C Choice Rules = 9

 1.D The Relationship between Preference Relations and Choice Rules = 11

 Exercises = 15

Chapter 2. Consumer Choice = 17

 2.A Introduction = 17

 2.B Commodities = 17

 2.C The Consumption Set = 18

 2.D Competitive Budgets = 20

 2.E Demand Functions and Comparative Statics = 23

 2.F The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and the Law of Demand = 28

 Exercises = 36

Chapter 3. Classical Demand Theory = 40

 3.A Introduction = 40

 3.B Preference Relations : Basic Properties = 41

 3.C Preference and Utility = 46

 3.D The Utility Maximization Problem = 50

 3.E The Expenditure Minimization Problem = 57

 3.F Duality : A Mathematical Introduction = 63

 3.G Relationships between Demand, Indirect Utility, and Expenditure Functions = 67

 3.H Integrability = 75

 3.I Welfare Evaluation of Economic Changes = 80

 3.J The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference = 91

 Appendix A : Continuity and Differentiability Properties of Walrasian Demand = 92

 Exercises = 96

Chapter 4. Aggregate Demand = 105

 4.A Introduction = 105

 4.B Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Wealth = 106

 4.C Aggregate Demand and the Weak Axiom = 109

 4.D Aggregate Demand and the Existence of a Representative Consumer = 116

 Appendix A : Regularizing Effects of Aggregation = 122

 Exercises = 123

Chapter 5. Production = 127

 5.A Introduction = 127

 5.B Production Sets = 128

 5.C Profit Maximization and Cost Minimization = 135

 5.D The Geometry of Cost and Supply in the Single-Output Case = 143

 5.E Aggregation = 147

 5.F Efficient Production = 149

 5.G Remarks on the Objectives of the Firm = 152

 Appendix A : The Linear Activity Model = 154

 Exercises = 160

Chapter 6. Choice Under Uncertainty = 167

 6.A Introduction = 167

 6.B Expected Utility Theory = 168

 6.C Money Lotteries and Risk Aversion = 183

 6.D Comparison of Payoff Distributions in Terms of Return and Risk = 194

 6.E State-dependent Utility = 199

 6.F Subjective Probability Theory = 205

 Exercises = 208

PART TWO : GAME THEORY = 217

Chapter 7. Basic Elements of Noncooperative Games = 219

 7.A Introduction = 219

 7.B What Is a Game? = 219

 7.C The Extensive Form Representation of a Game = 221

 7.D Strategies and the Normal Form Representation of a Game = 228

 7.E Randomized Choices = 231

 Exercises = 233

Chapter 8. Simultaneous-Move Games = 235

 8.A Introduction = 235

 8.B Dominant and Dominated Strategies = 236

 8.C Rationalizable Strategies = 242

 8.D Nash Equilibrium = 246

 8.E Games of Incomplete Information : Bayesian Nash Equilibrium = 253

 8.F The Possibility of Mistakes : Trembling-Hand Perfection = 258

 Appendix A : Existence of Hash Equilibrium = 260

 Exercises = 262

Chapter 9. Dynamic Games = 267

 9.A Introduction = 267

 9.B Sequential Rationality, Backward Induction, and Subgame Perfection = 268

 9.C Beliefs and Sequential Rationality = 282

 9.D Reasonable Beliefs and Forward Induction = 292

 Appendix A : Finite and Infinite Horizon Bilateral Bargaining = 296

 Appendix B : Extensive Form Trembling-Hand Perfect Nash Equilibrium = 299

 Exercises = 301

PART THREE : MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND MARKET FAILURE = 307

Chapter 10. Competitive Markets = 311

 10.A Introduction = 311

 10.B Pareto Optimality and Competitive Equilibria = 312

 10.C Partial Equilibrium Competitive Analysis = 316

 10.D The Fundamental Welfare Theorems in a Partial Equilibrium Context = 325

 10.E Welfare Analysis in the Partial Equilibrium Model = 328

 10.F Free-Entry and Long-Run Competitive Equilibria = 334

 10.G Concluding Remarks on Partial Equilibrium Analysis = 341

 Exercises = 344

Chapter 11. Externalities and Public Goods = 350

 11.A Introduction = 350

 11.B A Simple Bilateral Externality = 351

 11.C Public Goods = 359

 11.D Multilateral Externalities = 364

 11.E Private Information and Second-Best Solutions = 368

 Appendix A : Nonconvexities and the Theory of Externalities = 374

 Exercises = 378

Chapter 12. Market Power = 383

 12.4 Introduction = 383

 12.B Monopoly Pricing = 384

 12.C Static Models of Oligopoly = 387

 12.D Repeated Interaction = 400

 12.E Entry = 405

 12.F The Competitive Limit = 411

 12.G Strategic Precommitments to Affect Future Competition = 414

 Appendix A : Infinitely Repeated Games and the Folk Theorem = 417

 Appendix B : Strategic Entry Deterrence and Accommodation = 423

 Exercises = 428

Chapter 13. Adverse Selection, Signaling, and Screening = 436

 13.A Introduction = 436

 13.B Informational Asymmetries and Adverse Selection = 437

 13.C Signaling = 450

 13.D Screening = 460

 Appendix A : Reasonable-Beliefs Refinements in Signaling Games = 467

 Exercises = 473

Chapter 14. The Principal-Agent Problem = 477

 14.A Introduction = 477

 14.B Hidden Actions (Moral Hazard) = 478

 14.C Hidden Information(and Monopolistic Screening) = 488

 14.D Hidden Actions and Hidden Information : Hybrid Models = 501

 Appendix A : Multiple Effort Levels in the Hidden Action Model = 502

 Exercises = 507

PART FOUR : GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM = 511

Chapter 15. General Equilibrium Theory : Some Examples = 515

 15.A Introduction = 515

 15.B Pure Exchange : The Edgeworth Box = 515

 15.C The One-Consumer, One-Producer Economy = 525

 15.D The 2 ×2 Production Model = 529

 15.E General Versus Partial Equilibrium Theory = 538

 Exercises = 540

Chapter 16. Equilibrium and Its Basic Welfare Properties = 545

 16.A Introduction = 545

 16.B The Basic Model and Definitions = 546

 16.C The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics = 549

 16.D The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics = 551

 16.E Pareto Optimality and Social Welfare Optima = 558

 16.F First-Order Conditions for Pareto Optimality = 561

 16.G Some Applications = 566

 Appendix A : Technical Properties of the Set of Feasible Allocations = 573

 Exercises = 575

Chapter 17. The Positive Theory of Equilibrium = 578

 17.A Introduction = 578

 17.B Equilibrium : Definitions and Basic Equations = 579

 17.C Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium = 584

 17.D Local Uniqueness and the Index Theorem = 589

 17.E Anything Goes : The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem = 598

 17.F Uniqueness of Equilibria = 606

 17.G Comparative Statics Analysis = 616

 17.H T$$\hat a$$tonnement Stability = 620

 17.I Large Economies and Nonconvexities = 627

 Appendix A : Characterizing Equilibrium through Welfare Equations = 630

 Appendix B : A General Approach to the Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium = 632

 Exercises = 641

Chapter 18. Some Foundations for Competitive Equilibria = 652

 18.A Introduction = 652

 18.B Core and Equilibria = 652

 18.C Noncooperative Foundations of Walrasian Equilibria = 660

 18.D The Limits to Redistribution = 665

 18.E Equilibrium and the Marginal Productivity Principle = 670

 Appendix A : Cooperative Game Theory = 673

 Exercises = 684

Chapter 19. General Equilibrium Under Uncertainty = 687

 19.A Introduction = 687

 19.B A Market Economy with Contingent Commodities : Description = 688

 19.C Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium = 691

 19.D Sequential Trade = 694

 19.E Asset Markets = 699

 19.F Incomplete Markets = 709

 19.G Firm Behavior in General Equilibrium Models Under Uncertainty = 713

 19.H Imperfect Information = 716

 Exercises = 725

Chapter 20. Equilibrium and Time = 732

 20.A Introduction = 732

 20.B Intertemporal Utility = 733

 20.C Intertemporal Production and Efficiency = 736

 20.D Equilibrium : The One-Consumer Case = 743

 20.E Stationary Paths, Interest Rates, and Golden Rules = 754

 20.F Dynamics = 759

 20.G Equilibrium : Several Consumers = 765

 20.H Overlapping Generations = 769

 20.I Remarks on Nonequilibrium Dynamics : T$$\hat a$$tonnement and Learning = 778

 Exercises = 782

PART FIVE : WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INCENTIVES = 787

Chapter 21. Social Choice Theory = 789

 21.A Introduction = 789

 21.B A Special Case : Social Preferences over Two Alternatives = 790

 21.C The General Case : Arrow's Impossibility Theorem = 792

 21.D Some Possibility Results : Restricted Domains = 799

 21.E Social Choice Functions = 807

 Exercises = 812

Chapter 22. Elements of Welfare Economics and Axiomatic Bargaining = 817

 22.A Introduction = 817

 22.B Utility Possibility Sets = 818

 22.C Social Welfare Functions and Social Optima = 825

 22.D Invariance Properties of Social Welfare Functions = 831

 22.E The Axiomatic Bargaining Approach = 838

 22.F Coalitional Bargaining : The Shapley Value = 846

 Exercises = 850

Chapter 23. Incentives and Mechanism Design = 857

 23.A Introduction = 857

 23.B The Mechanism Design Problem = 858

 23.C Dominant Strategy Implementation = 869

 23.D Bayesian Implementation = 883

 23.E Participation Constraints = 891

 23.F Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms = 897

 Appendix A : Implementation and Multiple Equilibria = 910

 Appendix B : Implementation in Environments with Complete Information = 912

 Exercises = 918

MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX = 926

 M.A Matrix Notation for Derivatives = 926

 M.B Homogeneous Functions and Euler's Formula = 928

 M.C Concave and Quasiconcave Functions = 930

 M.D Matrices : Negative(Semi)Definiteness and Other Properties = 935

 M.E The Implicit Function Theorem = 940

 M.F Continuous Functions and Compact Sets = 943

 M.G Convex Sets and Separating Hyperplanes = 946

 M.H Correspondences = 949

 M.I Fixed Point Theorems = 952

 M.J Unconstrained Maximization = 954

 M.K Constrained Maximization = 956

 M.L The Envelope Theorem = 964

 M.M Linear Programming = 966

 M.N Dynamic Programming = 969

Index = 971