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J. Howard Sobel has long been recognized as an important figure in philosophical discussions of rational decision. He has done much to help formulate the concept of causal decision theory. In this volume of essays Sobel explores the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values, where an action's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. Newcomb's Problem and The Prisoner's Dilemma are discussed, and Allais-type puzzles are viewed from the perspective of causal world Bayesianism. The author establishes principles for distinguishing options in decision problems, and studies ways in which perfectly rational causal maximizers can be capable of resolute choices. Sobel also views critically Gauthier's revisionist ideas about maximizing rationality. This collection will be a desideratum for anyone working in the field of rational choice theory, whether in philosophy, economics, political science, psychology or statistics. Howard Sobel's work in decision theory is certainly among the most important, interesting and challenging that is being done by philosophers.

In this volume of essays Sobel explores the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values.

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CONTENTS
Preface = ⅸ
PART Ⅰ WORLD BAYESIANISM
 1 Utility theory and the Bayesian paradigm = 3
  0. Introduction = 3
  1. Utility theory = 4
  2. The problem = 5
  3. A reaction : Insist on complete basic alternatives = 9
  4. Utility theory within a more general theory = 13
  5. Summing up = 26
PART Ⅱ PROBLEMS FOR EVIDENTIAL DECISION THEORY
 2 Newcomblike problems = 31
  0. Introduction = 31
 A. Analysis and variety = 32
  1. An analysis of Newcomblike problems = 32
  2. The variety of Newcomblike problems = 33
 B. Objections = 36
  1. These are problems for space cadets = 36
  2. Deliberators cannot view their choices as signs of prior conditions = 38
  3. Agents who believe in causes for their actions = 41
  4. Agents who believe in causes for their choices = 45
  5. Newcomblike problems are not possible for ideally rational agents = 48
  6. Conclusions = 58
  Appendix Ⅰ : Statements of some Newcomblike problems = 60
  Appendix Ⅱ : Further structure for "Brian Skyrms's Uncle Albert" and "How do you spell relief?" = 63
  Appendix Ⅲ : Dominance problems = 65
  Appendix Ⅳ : Further structures for Newcomb's Problem = 66
  Appendix Ⅴ : Ratificationism = 68
 3 Not every prisoners' dilemma is a Newcomb Problem = 77
  0. Introduction = 77
  1. Near-certainty Newcomb problems = 78
  2. Near-certainty prisoners' dilemmas = 80
  3. Near-certainty Newcomb problems and prisoners' dilemmas compared = 80
  4. Conclusions = 86
 4 Some Versions of Newcomb's Problem are prisoners' dilemmas = 89
  0. Introduction = 89
  1. Preliminaries = 90
  2. Some, but not all, versions of Newcomb's Problem are prisoners' dilemmas = 92
  3. Further questions = 94
  4. Concluding remarks = 96
 5 Infallible predictors = 100
  0. Introduction = 100
  1. Predictors who are certainly incapable of error = 101
  2. Predictors who are certainly unerring = 105
  3. Conclusions = 111
 6 Kent Bach on good arguments = 119
 7 Maximizing and prospering = 126
  0. Introduction = 126
  1. Gauthier's pragmatism = 127
  2. Implications for Newcomb problems = 128
  3. Possibly disturbing aspects of these implications = 130
  4. Judgmental conclusions = 132
  Appendix : Socializing sentiments = 136
PARTⅢ CAUSAL DECISION THEORY
 8 Notes on decision theory : Old wine in new bottles = 141
  0. Introduction : Bayesian decision theory = 141
  1. Jeffrey's logic of decision = 143
  2. The popcorn problem = 145
  3. A causal decision theory = 152
  4. Conclusions = 164
  Appendix : Demonstrations of partition theorems = 165
 9 Partition theorems for causal decision theories = 174
  0. Introduction = 174
  1. A causal decision theory = 175
  2. Causal decision theories need partition theorems = 178
  3. Two partition theorems = 181
  4. Fishburn and conditional acts = 185
  5. Armendt on conditional preferences = 187
  6. Partitions for U and Exclusive Partitions compared = 191
  7. Uses of partition theorems = 192
  Appendix : A theorem for sufficiently fine partitions = 195
 10 Expected utilities and rational actions and choices = 197
  0. Introduction = 197
  1. Definitions, assumptions, and restrictions = 198
  2. The ideal stability of rational decisions = 200
  3. Principles that apply tests of expected utility to actions = 202
  4. A Principle that confines tests of expected utility to chocices = 212
  5. A Principle for agents who are sure they can make mixed choices = 215
  6. Conclusion = 215
 11 Maximization, stability of decision, and actions in accordance with reason = 218
  0. Introduction = 218
  1. Positions = 218
  2. Arguments and perspectives = 227
  3. The maximization and stability theory : Restatement and elaboration = 233
 12 Useful intentions = 237
  0. Introduction = 237
  1. Senses in which the rational cannot intend irrational actions = 238
  2. Forming and adopting intentions = 240
  3. Magical bootstrapping, and rational intentions and preferences = 243
  4. Rational adoption of intentions to do things that would otherwise be irrational = 246
  5. Conclusion = 251
  6. Postscript = 252
PART Ⅳ INTERACTING CAUSAL MAXIMIZERS
 13 The need for coercion = 257
  0. Introduction = 257
  1. The hyperrational community = 258
  2. The community's need for coercion = 262
  3. The individual's need for coercion = 270
  Appendix : The Farmer's Dilemma and mutual trust = 276
 14 Hyperrational games = 283
  0. Introduction = 283
  1. The concept of a hyperrational normal-form game = 283
  2. Resolutions of hyperrational games = 294
   Necessary conditions for, or limitations on, resolutions = 294
   Sufficient conditions for, and ways to, resolutions = 303
  3. Problems for members of hyperrational communities = 313
   Games in which they would not do well = 313
   Games in which they could not do anything at all = 315
   The significance of these problems = 324
  Appendix : Lewis domination = 325
 15 Utility maximizers in iterated prisoners' dilemmas = 330
  0. Introduction = 330
  1. The defeat of utility maximizers in iterated prisoners' dilemmas = 331
  2. The significance of this defeat = 338
 16 Backward induction arguments : A paradox regained = 345
  0. Introduction = 345
  1. Indicative rationality and belief premises = 346
  2. A backward argument for defection = 348
  3. Subjunctive rationality and belief premises = 351
  4. Interlude : Defense of common-knowledge premises = 358
  5. The paradox and its solution = 363
References = 367
Index of names = 375