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This book provides a critical examination of how the choice of what to believe is represented in the standard model of belief change. In particular the use of possible worlds and infinite remainders as objects of choice is critically examined.

Descriptors are introduced as a versatile tool for expressing the success conditions of belief change, addressing both local and global descriptor revision. The book presents dynamic descriptors such as Ramsey descriptors that convey how an agent’s beliefs tend to be changed in response to different inputs. It also explores sentential revision and demonstrates how local and global operations of revision by a sentence can be derived as a special case of descriptor revision. Lastly, the book examines revocation, a generalization of contraction in which a specified sentence is removed in a process that may possibly also involve the addition of some new information to the belief set.

New feature

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Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Symbols -- Preview -- Part I Why a New Approach? -- 1 The State of the Art -- 1.1 A Sentential, Input-Assimilating Approach -- 1.2 The AGM Construction -- 1.3 The AGM Postulates -- 1.4 Possible World Models -- 1.5 Epistemic Entrenchment -- 1.6 Conclusion -- 2 Inside the Black Box -- 2.1 Epistemic Choice -- 2.2 The Select-and-Intersect Method -- 2.3 Is the Intersection as Good as Its Origins? -- 2.4 Do All Success Conditions Withstand Intersection? -- 2.5 Do We Select Among the Right Objects? -- 3 Questionable Patterns of Change -- 3.1 The Postulates of Finite-Based Outcome -- 3.2 The Success Postulates -- 3.3 The Recovery Postulate -- 3.4 Pure Contraction and the Inclusion Postulate -- 3.5 The Expansion Property -- 3.6 Extending the Language -- 3.7 Iterated Change -- 3.8 Ten Desiderata for an Alternative Framework -- Part II Descriptor Revision -- 4 Putting the Building-Blocks Together -- 4.1 Beginning Without Sentences -- 4.2 Support Functions -- 4.3 Belief Descriptors -- 4.4 Properties of Descriptors -- 4.5 Descriptor Revision Introduced -- 4.6 Conclusion -- 5 Local Descriptor Revision -- 5.1 Monoselective Descriptor Revision -- 5.2 Linear and Centrolinear Revision -- 5.3 Indeterministic Descriptor Revision -- 5.4 Blockage Revision -- 5.5 Relations of Epistemic Proximity -- 6 Global Descriptor Revision -- 6.1 Global Monoselective and Centrolinear Revision -- 6.2 Distance-Based Global Revision -- 6.3 Global Blockage Revision -- 7 Dynamic Descriptors -- 7.1 Representing Autoepistemic Beliefs -- 7.2 Ramsey Descriptors -- 7.3 The Logic of Ramsey Descriptors -- 7.4 Alternative Approaches to Conditionals -- 7.5 Non-Monotonic Inference -- 7.6 Modalities of Belief -- Part III Sentential Change Revisited -- 8 Sentential Revision -- 8.1 Sentential Monoselective Revision -- 8.2 Sentential Centrolinear Revision -- 8.3 Global Sentential Revision -- 8.4 Believability Relations -- 8.5 Multiple Revision and Making up One''s Mind -- 9 Revocation -- 9.1 Monoselective Revocation -- 9.2 Centrolinear Revocation -- 9.3 Entrenchment -- 9.4 Multiple Revocation and Entrenchment -- 9.5 A Revisionary Account of Giving up Beliefs -- 10 Contraction -- 10.1 How to Construct Contraction -- 10.2 Centrolinear and Maximal Contraction -- 10.3 Two Impossibility Theorems -- 10.4 Monomaximal Contraction -- 10.5 Perimaximal Contraction -- 10.6 Bootstrap Contraction -- Part IV Epilogue -- 11 Looking Back -- and Ahead -- 11.1 Looking Back -- 11.2 Looking Ahead -- Appendices -- Proofs -- Bibliography -- Index -- .