| 000 | 00000cam u2200205 a 4500 | |
| 001 | 000046119830 | |
| 005 | 20220629110200 | |
| 008 | 220627s2022 enk b 001 0 eng | |
| 010 | ▼a 2021060109 | |
| 020 | ▼a 9781108842259 ▼q (hardback) | |
| 020 | ▼a 9781108827416 ▼q (paperback) | |
| 020 | ▼z 9781108907071 ▼q (epub) | |
| 035 | ▼a (KERIS)REF000019836775 | |
| 040 | ▼a DLC ▼b eng ▼e rda ▼c DLC ▼d 211009 | |
| 042 | ▼a pcc | |
| 050 | 0 0 | ▼a BJ1535.F3 ▼b M33 2022 |
| 082 | 0 0 | ▼a 158.2 ▼2 23 |
| 084 | ▼a 158.2 ▼2 DDCK | |
| 090 | ▼a 158.2 ▼b M131p | |
| 100 | 1 | ▼a McCormick, Kelly ▼q (Kelly Anne), ▼e author. |
| 245 | 1 4 | ▼a The problem of blame : ▼b making sense of moral anger / ▼c Kelly McCormick, Texas Christian University. |
| 260 | ▼a Cambridge, United Kingdom ; ▼a New York, NY, USA : ▼b Cambridge University Press, ▼c 2022. | |
| 264 | 1 | ▼a Cambridge, United Kingdom ; ▼a New York, NY, USA : ▼b Cambridge University Press, ▼c 2022. |
| 300 | ▼a xii, 223 p. ; ▼c 24 cm. | |
| 336 | ▼a text ▼b txt ▼2 rdacontent | |
| 337 | ▼a unmediated ▼b n ▼2 rdamedia | |
| 338 | ▼a volume ▼b nc ▼2 rdacarrier | |
| 504 | ▼a Includes bibliographical references and index. | |
| 520 | ▼a "In Chapter 1 I attempt to explicate the problem of blame by making use of an analogy with another more familiar problem relevant to permissibility and harm - the problem of punishment. I argue that this comparison serves to highlight two clear desiderata for a normatively adequate account of blame, one concerning the value of blame and another concerning desert. In this first chapter I also argue that the problem of blame concerns the reactive varieties of blame in particular, offer some principled strategies for distinguishing between reactive and non-reactive varieties of blame, and discuss the role that the negative reactive attitudes play in characterizing the former. In Chapter 2 I turn my focus to the desert-based desideratum for a normatively adequate account of reactive blame. I begin with an issue that often plays a central role in obscuring whether the problem of blame can be resolved, namely how we ought to understand the concept of basic desert. Adjacent to the problem of blame, debates about free will and moral responsibility often seem to bottom out in appeals to whether or not the account on offer can deliver basic desert of blame. However, little progress has been made in explicating precisely what basic desert of blame amounts to. I argue that once we have restricted our focus to reactive blame in particular, a clearer picture of basic desert emerges. I go on to offer an analysis of basic desert of reactive blame which I call the fittingness account, and argue that it can provide the first step in resolving the problem of blame"-- ▼c Provided by publisher. | |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Faultfinding. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Blame. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Justice. |
| 945 | ▼a ITMT |
소장정보
| No. | 소장처 | 청구기호 | 등록번호 | 도서상태 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. 1 | 소장처 중앙도서관/서고6층/ | 청구기호 158.2 M131p | 등록번호 111866280 | 도서상태 대출가능 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
컨텐츠정보
책소개
This book makes a case for the permissibility of reactive blame - the angry, harmful variety. Blame is a thorny philosophical problem, as it is notoriously difficult to specify the conditions under which an agent is deserving of blame, is deserving of blame in the basic sense, and furthermore why this is so. Kelly McCormick argues that sharpening the focus to reactive, angry blame can both show us how best to characterize the problem itself, and suggest a possible solution to it, because even reactive blame is both valuable and deserved in the basic sense. Finally, McCormick shows how, despite the many facets of the dark side of blame, adopting an explicitly victim-centered approach highlights a powerful argument from empathy for retaining reactive blame and its attendant attitudes and practices.
정보제공 :
목차
Introduction; Part I. The Permissibility of Blame: 1. The problem of blame; 2. The structure of basic desert; 3. Blame and the reactive attitudes; 4. Solving the problem of blame; Part II. Prescriptive Preservationism and Eliminativism: 5. The methodological burdens for eliminativism; 6. Free will, responsibility, and reference; 7. Facing the dark side.