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This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point.

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.

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CONTENTS
Acknowledgments = xv
Introduction = xvii
Ⅰ Static Games of Complete Information = 1
 1 Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium = 3
  1.1 Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated Strict Dominance = 4
   1.1.1 Strategic - Form Games = 4
   1.1.2 Dominated Strategies = 4
   1.1.3 Applications of the Elimination of Dominated Strategies = 9
  1.2 Nash Equilibrium = 11
   1.2.1 Definition of Nash Equilibrium = 11
   1.2.2 Examples of Pure - Strategy Equilibria = 14
   1.2.3 Nonexistence of a Pure - Strategy Equilibrium = 16
   1.2.4 Multiple Nash Equilibria, Focal Points, and Pareto Optimality = 18
   1.2.5 Nash Equilibrium as the Result of Learning or Evolution = 23
  1.3 Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria = 29
   1.3.1 Existence of a Mixed - Strategy Equilibrium = 29
   1.3.2 The Nash - Equilibrium Correspondence Has a Closed Graph = 30
   1.3.3 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Infinite Games with Continuous Payoffs = 34
   Exercises = 36
   References = 42
 2 Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and Correlated Equilibrium = 45
  2.1 Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability = 45
   2.1.1 Iterated Strict Dominance : Definition and Properties = 45
   2.1.2 An Application of Iterated Strict Dominance = 47
   2.1.3 Rationalizability = 48
   2.1.4 Raitonalizability and Iterated Strict Dominance = 50
   2.1.5 Discussion = 53
  2.2 Correlated Equilibrium = 53
  2.3 Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibria = 59
   Exercises = 60
   References = 63
Ⅱ Dynamic Games of Complete Information = 65
 3 Extensive - Form Games = 67
  3.1 Introduction = 67
  3.2 Commitment and Perfection in Multi - Stage Games with Observed Actions = 70
   3.2.1 What is a Multi - Stage Game? = 70
   3.2.2 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection = 72
   3.2.3 The Value of Commitment and "Time Consistency" = 74
  3.3 The Extensive Form = 77
   3.3.1 Definition = 77
   3.3.2 Multi - stage Games with Observed Actions = 82
  3.4 Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive - Form Games = 83
   3.4.1 Behavior Strategies = 83
   3.4.2 The Strategic - Form Representation of Extensive - Form Games = 85
   3.4.3 The Equivalence between Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Games of Perfect Recall = 87
   3.4.4 Iterated Strict Dominance and Nash Equilibrium = 90
  3.5 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection = 92
  3.6 Critiques of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection = 96
   3.6.1 Critiques of Backward Induction = 97
   3.6.2 Critiques of Subgame Perfection = 99
   Exercises = 100
   References = 105
 4 Applications of Multi - Stage Games with Observed Actions = 107
  4.1 Introduction = 107
  4.2 The Principle of Optimality and Subgame Perfection = 108
  4.3 A First Look at Repeated Games = 110
   4.3.1 The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma = 110
   4.3.2 A Finitely Repeated Game with Several Static Equilibria = 112
  4.4 The Rubinstein - St$$\mathop a\limits \circ $$hl Bargaining Model = 113
   4.4.1 A Subgame - Perfect Equilibrium = 113
   4.4.2 Uniquenss of the Infinite - Horizon Equilibrium = 115
   4.4.3 Comparative Statics = 116
  4.5 Simple Timing Games = 117
   4.5.1 Definition of Simple Timing Games = 117
   4.5.2 The War of Attrition = 120
   4.5.3 Preemption Games = 126
  4.6 Iterated Conditional Dominance and the Rubinstein Bargaining Game = 128
  4.7 Open - Loop and Closed - Loop Equilibria = 130
   4.7.1 Definitions = 130
   4.7.2 A Two - Period Example = 132
   4.7.3 Open - Loop and Closed - Loop Equilibria in Games with Many Players = 133
  4.8 Finite - Horizon and Infinite - Horizon Equilibria = 134
   Exercises = 138
   References = 141
 5 Repeated Games = 145
  5.1 Repeated Games with Observable Actions = 146
   5.1.1 The Model = 146
   5.1.2 The Folk Theorem for Infinitely Repeated Games = 150
   5.1.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium Set = 160
  5.2 Finitely Repeated Games = 165
  5.3 Repeated Games with Varying Opponents = 168
   5.3.1 Repeated Games with Long - Run and Short - Run Players = 168
   5.3.2 Games with Overlapping Generations of Players = 171
   5.3.3 Randomly Matched Opponents = 172
  5.4 Pareto Perfection and Renegotiation - Proofness in Repeated Games = 174
   5.4.1 Introduction = 174
   5.4.2 Pareto Perfection in Finitely Repeated Games = 176
   5.4.3 Renegotiation - Proofness in Infinitely Repeated Games = 179
  5.5 Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information = 182
   5.5.1 The model = 183
   5.5.2 Trigger - Price Strategies = 185
   5.5.3 Public Strategies and Public Equilibria = 187
   5.5.4 Dynamic Programming and Self - Generation = 188
  5.6 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information = 192
  5.7 Changing the Information Structure with the Time Period = 197
   Exercises = 200
   References = 203
Ⅲ Static Games of Incomplete Information = 207
 6 Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium = 209
  6.1 Incomplete Information = 209
  6.2 Example 6. 1 : Providing a Public Good under Incomplete Information = 211
  6.3 The Notions of Type and Strategy = 213
  6.4 Bayesian Equilibrium = 215
  6.5 Further Examples of Bayesian Equilibria = 215
  6.6 Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies = 226
   6.6.1 Interim vs. Ex Ante Dominance = 226
   6.6.2 Examples of Iterated Strict Dominance = 228
  6.7 Using Bayesian Equilibria to Justify Mixed Equilibria = 230
   6.7.1 Examples = 230
   6.7.2 Purification Theorem = 233
  6.8 The Distributional Approach = 234
   Exercises = 237
   References = 241
 7 Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design = 243
  7.1 Examples of Mechanism Design = 246
   7.1.1 Nonlinear Pricing = 246
   7.1.2. Auctions = 250
  7.2 Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle = 253
   7.3.1 Implementable Decisions and Allocations = 258
   7.3.2 Optimal Mechanisms = 262
  7.4 Mechanisms with Several Agents : Feasible Allocations, Budget Balance, and Efficiency = 268
   7.4.1 Feasibility under Budget Balance = 269
   7.4.2 Dominant Strategy vs. Bayesian Mechanisms = 270
   7.4.3 Efficiency Theorems = 271
   7.4.4 Inefficiency Theorems = 275
   7.4.5 Efficiency Limit Theorems = 279
   7.4.6 Strong Inefficiency Limit Theorems = 281
  7.5 Mechanism Design with Several Agents : Optimization = 284
   7.5.1 Auctions = 284
   7.5.2 Efficient Bargaining Processes = 288
  7.6 Further Topics in Mechanism Design = 292
   7.6.1 Correlated Types = 292
   7.6.2 Risk Aversion = 295
   7.6.3 Informed Principal = 297
   7.6.4 Dynamic Mechanism Design = 299
   7.6.5 Common Agency = 301
   Appendix = 303
   Exercises = 308
   References = 314
Ⅳ Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information = 319
 8 Equilibrium Refinements : Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and Trembling - Hand Perfection = 321
  8.1 Introduction 321
  8.2 Perfect Bayesin Equilibrium in Multi - Stage Games of Incomplete Information = 324
   8.2.1 The Basic Signaling Game = 324
   8.2.2 Examples of Signaling Games = 326
   8.2.3 Multi - Stage Games with Observed Actions and Incomplete Information = 331
  8.3 Extensive - Form Refinements = 336
   8.3.1 Review of Game Trees = 336
   8.3.2 Sequential Equilibrium = 337
   8.3.3 Properties of Sequential Equilibrium = 341
   8.3.4 Sequential Equilibrium Compared with Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium = 345
  8.4 Strategic - Form Refinements = 350
   8.4.1 Trembling - Hand Perfect Equilibrium = 351
   8.4.2 Proper Equilibrium = 356
   Appendix = 359
   Exercises = 360
   References = 364
 9 Reputation Effects = 367
  9.1 Introduction = 367
  9.2 Games with a Single Long - Run Player = 369
   9.2.1 The Chain = Store Game = 369
   9.2.2 Reputation Effects with a Single Long - Run Player : The General Case = 374
   9.2.3 Extensive - Form Stage Games = 381
  9.3 Games with Many Long - Run Players = 384
   9.3.1 General Stage Games and General Reputations = 384
   9.3.2 Common - Interest Games and Bounded - Recall Reputations = 386
  9.4 A Single "Big" Player against Many Simultaneous Long - Lived Opponents = 389
   Exercises = 391
   References = 394
 10 Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information = 397
  10.1 Introduction = 397
  10.2 Intertemporal Price Discrimination : The Single - Sale Model = 400
   10.2.1 The Framework = 400
   10.2.2 A Two - Period Introduction to Coasian Dynamics = 402
   10.2.3 An Infinite - Horizon Example of the Coase Conjecture = 405
   10.2.4 The Skimming Property = 406
   10.2.5 The Gap Case = 408
   10.2.6 The No - Gap Case = 411
   10.2.7 Gap vs. No Gap and Extensions of the Single - Sale Model = 414
  10.3 Intertemporal Price Discrimination : The Rental or Repeated - Sale Model = 416
   10.3.1 Short-Term Contracts = 417
   10.3.2 Long - Term Constracts and Renegotiation = 419
  10.4 Price Offers by an Informed Buyer = 421
   10.4.1 One - Sided Offers and Bilateral Asymmetric Information = 422
   10.4.2 Alternating Offers and One - Sided Asymmetric Information = 424
   10.4.3 Mechanism Design and Bargaining = 427
   Exercises = 428
   References = 432
Ⅴ Advanced Topics
 11 More Equilibrium Refinements : Stability, Forward Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance = 437
  11.1 Strategic Stability = 437
  11.2 Signaling Games = 446
  11.3 Forward Induction, Iterated Weak Dominance, and "Burning Money" = 460
  11.4 Robust Predictions under Payoff Uncertainty = 467
   Exercises = 473
   References = 475
 12 Advanced Topics in Strategic - Form Games = 479
  12.1 Generic Properties of Nash Equilibria = 479
   12.1.1 Number of Nash Equilibria = 479
   12.1.2 Robustness of Equilibria to Payoff Perturbations = 480
  12.2 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Action Spaces and Discontinuous Payoffs = 484
   12.2.1 Existence of a Pure - Strategy Equilibrium = 485
   12.2.2 Existence of a Mixed - Strategy Equilibrium = 487
  12.3 Supermodular Games = 489
   Exercises = 497
   References = 498
 13 Payoff - Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium = 501
  13.1 Markov Equilibria in Specific Classes of Games = 503
   13.1.1 Stochastic Games : Definition and Existence of MPE = 503
   13.1.2 Separable Sequential Games = 505
   13.1.3 Examples from Economics = 507
  13.2 Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General Games : Definition and Properties = 513
   13.2.1 Definition = 513
   13.2.2 Existence = 515
   13.2.3 Robustness to Payoff Perturbations = 518
  13.3 Differential Games = 520
   13.3.1 Definition = 520
   13.3.2 Equilibrium Conditions = 521
   13.3.3 Linear - Quadratic Differential Games = 523
   13.3.4 Zero - Sum Differential Games = 527
  13.4 Capital - Accumulation Games = 528
   13.4.1 Open - Loop, Closed - Loop, and Markov Strategies = 529
   13.4.2 Differential - Game Strategies = 534
   Exercises = 536
   References = 537
 14 Common Knowledge and Games = 541
  14.1 Introduction = 541
  14.2 Knowledge and Common Knowledge = 542
  14.3 Common Knowledge and Equilibrium = 546
   14.3.1 The Dirty Faces and the Sage = 547
   14.3.2 Agreeing to Disagree = 548
   14.3.3 No - Speculation Theorems = 550
   14.3.4 Interim Efficiency and Incomplete Contracts = 554
  14.4 Common Knowledge, Almost Common Knowledge, and the Sensitivity of Equilibria to the Information Structure = 554
   14.4.1 The Lack of Lower Hemi - Continuity = 556
   14.4.2 Lower Hemi - Continuity and Almost Common Knowledge = 562
   Exercises = 570
   References = 571
Index = 573