상세정보

Odd Man Out is a novel assessment of the motives and strategies of Harry Truman, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong as they struggled to maneuver their countries into positions of advantage in the postwar world. Their successes and failures resulted in the catastrophic event that globalized the Cold War ---the Korean War. Based on recently released secret documents, Richard Thornton puts the reader inside the American, Soviet and Chinese decision-making processes during these earth-shaking events, events that have been misinterpreted for decades.

정보제공 :

Map ix 
Preface xi 
Introduction 1 (8) 
PART I THREE ALTERNATIVE FUTURES 
Truman and the ``Wedge' Strategy in 1949 9 (15) 
The Attempt to Keep the Chinese and 9 (6) 
Russians Apart 
The Soviet Atomic Bomb Complicates American 15 (3) 
China Policy 
The Crumbling of American Strategy 18 (4) 
The Sino-Soviet Alliance Defeats the Wedge 22 (2) 
Mao and Stalin: A Modus Vivendi? 24 (27) 
Stalin Attempts to Retain World War II 26 (7) 
Gains in China 
Liu Shaoqi''s Trip to Moscow 33 (6) 
Mao Zedong Goes to Moscow 39 (7) 
Stalin''s Decision for War in Korea 46 (5) 
Truman Increased His Offer 51 (30) 
A Proposal for China 52 (8) 
Washington Begins to Show Its Cards 60 (5) 
A Desperate Attempt to Strike a Deal 65 (5) 
The New York Times and Acheson''s Speech 70 (4) 
The Prospect of Negotiations Evaporates 74 (7) 
PART II MAO''S CHOICE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
Mao Wants It Both Ways, But First the Treaty 81 (20) 
Stalin Sets the Stage 81 (5) 
The Korean Factor Enters 86 (4) 
The Treaty Negotiations Begin 90 (5) 
Stalin''s ``Second Group' of Issues 95 (6) 
Stalin Versus Mao, Korea or Taiwan: The Race 101(18) 
to Strike First 
Stalin Plots Preemptive War 101(5) 
Kim Il-sung and Mao Zedong 106(7) 
Mao: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue 113(6) 
Strait 
Truman''s Dilemma and the Decision to Change 119(27) 
Strategy 
Strategy and Consequences 119(3) 
The Question of Foreknowledge 122(5) 
The United States Changes Strategy 127(5) 
Washinton Girds for Confrontation 132(3) 
The Problem of Japan 135(6) 
The Problem of Taiwan 141(5) 
Korea and Containment 146(39) 
South Korea in U.S. Strategy 147(3) 
Tethering the South Korean Goat 150(4) 
Muccio''s and Roberts''s Pleas for Assistance 154(10) 
Ignored 
Washington Gives Muccio the Runaround 164(6) 
The Tank Threat Emerges 170(7) 
Discovery and Response 177(8) 
PART III KOREA: A WAR OF SURPRISES 
The First Week: June 25---June 30 185(42) 
Initial Asault: The First Surprise 186(1) 
The First Blair House Meeting 187(13) 
The Second Blair House Meeting 200(11) 
Truman Prepares to Commit Ground Forces 211(4) 
The Argument over Forward Defense 215(12) 
Stalin and Truman: Different Means to the 227(20) 
Same End 
Stalin''s ``Preemptive Strike Operational 228(8) 
Plan' 
Plan ``B': The Drive South 236(4) 
Truman Builds a Nutcracker 240(7) 
Mao Attempts to Avoid Entrapment 247(30) 
Mao''s Fundamental Miscalculation 248(1) 
Early Wartime Discussions with Stalin 249(8) 
Initial Sino-American Interaction 257(8) 
Mao Decides against Early Involvement 265(1) 
Mao Probes Unsuccessfully for a Diplomatic 266(4) 
Settlement 
Mao''s Trial Balloons 270(7) 
PART IV EMERGENCE OF A NEW WORLD ORDER 
Truman: From Deterrence to Compulsion 277(39) 
Mao, Stalin, MacArthur, and Inchon 279(8) 
U.S. Deterrence Prior to Inchon 287(6) 
The Debate over War Aims 293(6) 
Defense Presses for Unification 299(5) 
The Allies Alter the Policy Equation 304(3) 
NSC-81, the Joint Chiefs, and MacArthur 307(4) 
Stalin, Kim Il-sung, and Inchon 311(5) 
Mao and the Decision to Enter the Korean War 316(32) 
Truman Unwraps His Package of Compulsion 317(4) 
Stalin Intensifies the Pressure for 321(6) 
Commitment 
MacArthur''s ``Wonsan Gambit' 327(6) 
Mao Attempts to ``Negotiate' Chinese Entry 333(8) 
Stalin Calls Mao''s Bluff 341(7) 
Truman and the New World Order 348(32) 
The Signt Conundrum 349(4) 
MacArthur Will Share Blame 353(5) 
The Wake Island Meeting 358(4) 
On to the Yalu 362(8) 
The November 9 Meeting: Maintaining Course 370(4) 
Proposals, Counterproposals, and War 374(6) 
Conclusion 380(3) 
Notes 383(48) 
Index 431