| 000 | 00000cam u2200205 a 4500 | |
| 001 | 000045136915 | |
| 005 | 20250829141345 | |
| 008 | 041208s2001 nyu b 000 0 eng d | |
| 010 | ▼a ?2280602 | |
| 020 | ▼a 0815340222 | |
| 040 | ▼a IND ▼c DLC ▼d IND ▼d UKM ▼d 211009 | |
| 042 | ▼a lccopycat | |
| 050 | 0 0 | ▼a QA279.4 ▼b .E45 2001 |
| 082 | 0 0 | ▼a 658.4/03 ▼2 21 |
| 090 | ▼a 658.403 ▼b E47r | |
| 100 | 1 | ▼a Ellsberg, Daniel, ▼d 1931- ▼0 AUTH(211009)150461. |
| 245 | 1 0 | ▼a Risk, ambiguity, and decision / ▼c Daniel Ellsberg ; [with an introduction by Isaac Levi]. |
| 260 | ▼a New York, NY : ▼b Garland Pub., ▼c 2001. | |
| 300 | ▼a liii, 281 p. ; ▼c 24 cm. | |
| 490 | 1 | ▼a Studies in philosophy |
| 500 | ▼a Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Harvard University, 1962. | |
| 504 | ▼a "Further readings on choice under uncertainty, beliefs and the Ellsberg paradox / compiled by Mark J. Machina": p. xxxix-xlviii. | |
| 504 | ▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. 271-281). | |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Decision making. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Statistical decision. |
| 830 | 0 | ▼a Studies in philosophy (New York, N.Y.). |
소장정보
| No. | 소장처 | 청구기호 | 등록번호 | 도서상태 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. 1 | 소장처 중앙도서관/교육보존A/6 | 청구기호 658.403 E47r | 등록번호 111302321 | 도서상태 대출가능 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
컨텐츠정보
책소개
Ellsberg's 1962 doctoral dissertation in economics was the basis for a groundbreaking and controversial article that challenged the dominant theory of rational decision by distinguishing between risk and ambiguity. The full dissertation is printed here for the first time, introduced by Isaac Levi (philosophy, Columbia U.). The dissertation, Levi notes, shows Ellsberg to be an important pioneer in the study of patterns of choice behavior when decision-makers are reluctant to make quantitative or even comparative judgements of probability. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
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목차
Acknowledgments; Note to Reader; Foreword, Isaac Levi ; 1. Ambiguity and Risk; Vagueness, Confidence, and the Weight of Arguments; The Nature and Uses of Normative Theory; The Validation of Normative Propositions; The Utility Axioms as Norms; Normative Theory and Empirical Research; 2. The Bernoulli Proposition; A Possible Counterexample: Are there Uncertainties that are Not Risks?; Vulgar Evaluations of Risk; 3. The Measurement of Definite Opinions; von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities; Probability as Price; "Coherence" and "Definiteness" of Probability-Prices; Appendix to Chapter Three; On Making a Fool of Oneself: The Requirement of Coherence; Acceptable Odds: Definite, Coherent, and Otherwise; 4. Opinions and Actions: Which Come First?; The Logic of Degrees of Belief; Opinions that Make Horse Races; Postulate 2: the "Sure-Thing Principle"; Intuitive Probabilities and "Vagueness"; Appendix to Chapter Four; The Savage Postulates; The Koopman Axioms; 5. Uncertainties that are Not Risks; The "Three-Color Urn" Example; Vulgar Evaluations of Ambiguity; Appendix to Chapter Five; 6. Why Are Some Uncertainties Not Risks?; Decision Criteria for "Complete Ignorance"; Decision Criteria for "Partial Ignorance"; 7. The "Restricted Hurwicz Criterion"; The "Restricted Bayes/Hurwicz Criterion"; Boldness and Prudence: the "n-Color Urn" Example; Ignorance, Probability, and Varieties of Gamblers; 8. Ambiguity and the Utility Axioms; The Pratt/Raiffa Criticisms and the Value of Randomization; Rubin's Axiom; Allais and the Sure-Thing Principle; Winning at Russian Roulette; Bibliography
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