| 000 | 00000cam u2200205 a 4500 | |
| 001 | 000045878663 | |
| 005 | 20160817144609 | |
| 008 | 160812s2016 nyu b 001 0 eng d | |
| 010 | ▼a 2015039155 | |
| 020 | ▼a 9781107008755 (hardback) | |
| 020 | ▼a 9781107401310 (paperback) | |
| 035 | ▼a (KERIS)REF000017902850 | |
| 040 | ▼a DLC ▼b eng ▼c DLC ▼e rda ▼d DLC ▼d 211009 | |
| 043 | ▼a n-us--- | |
| 050 | 0 0 | ▼a JK421 ▼b .M458 2016 |
| 082 | 0 0 | ▼a 352.20973 ▼2 23 |
| 084 | ▼a 352.20973 ▼2 DDCK | |
| 090 | ▼a 352.20973 ▼b M648a | |
| 100 | 1 | ▼a Miller, Gary J. |
| 245 | 1 0 | ▼a Above politics : ▼b bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment / ▼c Gary J. Miller, Washington University in St. Louis; Andrew B. Whitford, University of Georgia. |
| 260 | ▼a New York, NY : ▼b Cambridge University Press, ▼c 2016. | |
| 300 | ▼a xii, 271 p. ; ▼c 23 cm. | |
| 490 | 1 | ▼a Political economy of institutions and decisions |
| 504 | ▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. 239-260) and index. | |
| 520 | ▼a "Economic development requires secure contract enforcement and stable property rights. Normal majority-rule politics, such as bargaining over distributive and monetary policies, generate instability and frequently undermine economic development. Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy. Even more compelling is professionalism, which embeds its professional practitioners in professional norms and culture, and incidentally mitigates corruption. Financial examples are provided throughout the book, which ends with an analysis of the role played by professionalized bureaucracies during the Great Recession"-- ▼c Provided by publisher. | |
| 520 | ▼a "Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy"-- ▼c Provided by publisher. | |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Administrative agencies ▼z United States. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Executive departments ▼z United States. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Bureaucracy ▼z United States. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Separation of powers ▼z United States. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Civil service ethics ▼z United States. |
| 651 | 0 | ▼a Public administration ▼x Moral and ethical aspects. |
| 651 | 0 | ▼a United States ▼x Economic policy. |
| 700 | 1 | ▼a Whitford, Andrew B. |
| 830 | 0 | ▼a Political economy of institutions and decisions. |
| 945 | ▼a KLPA |
Holdings Information
| No. | Location | Call Number | Accession No. | Availability | Due Date | Make a Reservation | Service |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. 1 | Location Main Library/Western Books/ | Call Number 352.20973 M648a | Accession No. 111760432 (12회 대출) | Availability Available | Due Date | Make a Reservation | Service |
Contents information
Book Introduction
Economic development requires secure contract enforcement and stable property rights. Normal majority-rule politics, such as bargaining over distributive and monetary policies, generate instability and frequently undermine economic development. Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy. Even more compelling is professionalism, which embeds its professional practitioners in professional norms and culture, and incidentally mitigates corruption. Financial examples are provided throughout the book, which ends with an analysis of the role played by professionalized bureaucracies during the Great Recession.
This book argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, if they are insulated from unstable democratic politics.
Information Provided By: :
Table of Contents
CONTENTS Preface = vii Acknowledgments = xi 1. Introduction = 1 2. The Moral Hazard of Bureaucrats and Politicians = 24 3. Political Moral Hazard and Credible Commitment = 53 4. Political Moral Hazard and Bureaucratic Autonomy = 77 5. "Above Politics" : The Separation of Powers and Bureaucratic Autonomy = 100 6. The Control Paradox, Trust, and Leadership = 120 7. Professionalism and Credible Commitment = 141 8. The Politicization of Financial Regulation = 168 9. The Financial Crisis and Reregulation = 201 10. Conclusion : The Unraveling of Dodd-Frank = 220 Works Cited = 239 Index = 261