| 000 | 01034namuu2200289 a 4500 | |
| 001 | 000045474974 | |
| 005 | 20081001113657 | |
| 008 | 910429r19931992enk b 001 0 eng d | |
| 020 | ▼a 9780521457699 (pbk.) | |
| 020 | ▼a 0521457696 (pbk.) | |
| 040 | ▼a DLC ▼c DLC ▼d DLC ▼d 211009 | |
| 050 | 4 | ▼a HD31 ▼b .M442 1993 |
| 082 | 0 4 | ▼a 658.4/02 ▼2 22 |
| 090 | ▼a 658.402 ▼b D566t | |
| 100 | 1 | ▼a Miller, Gary J. |
| 245 | 1 0 | ▼a Managerial dilemmas : ▼b the political economy of hierarchy / ▼c Gary J. Miller. |
| 260 | ▼a Cambridge [England] ; ▼a New York : ▼b Cambridge University Press , ▼c 1993 ▼g (2006 printing) | |
| 300 | ▼a xv, 254 p. ; ▼c 23 cm. | |
| 440 | 4 | ▼a The Political economy of institutions and decisions |
| 504 | ▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. 239-245) and indexes. | |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Industrial management. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Organizational behavior. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Psychology, Industrial. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Employee motivation. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Incentives in industry. |
| 945 | ▼a KINS |
소장정보
| No. | 소장처 | 청구기호 | 등록번호 | 도서상태 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. 1 | 소장처 중앙도서관/서고7층/ | 청구기호 658.402 D566t | 등록번호 111497832 (10회 대출) | 도서상태 대출가능 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
컨텐츠정보
책소개
In organisation theory a schism has developed between the traditional organisational behaviour literature, based in psychology, sociology and political science, and the more analytically rigorous field of organisational economics. The former stresses the importance of managerial leadership and cooperation among employees, while the latter focuses on the engineering of incentive systems that will induce efficiency and profitability, by rewarding worker self-interest. In this innovative book, Gary Miller bridges the gap between these literatures. He demonstrates that it is impossible to design an incentive system based on self-interest that will effectively discipline all subordinates and superiors and obviate or overcome the roles of political conflict, collective action, and leadership in an organisation. Applying game theory to the analysis of the roles of cooperation and political leadership in organisational hierarchies, he concludes that the organisation whose managers can inspire cooperation and the transcendence of short-term interest in its employees enjoys a competitive advantage.
Managerial Dilemmas extends the use of analytical techniques from organisational economics to the spheres of organisational culture and leadership in politics and business.
정보제공 :
목차
CONTENTS List of tables and figures ⅸ Series editors' preface = xi Acknowledgments = xiii Introduction = 1 PART Ⅰ WHY HAVE HIERARCHY? = 15 1 Market failures and hierarchical solutions : the tension between individual and social rationality = 19 2 Bargaining failure : coordination, bargaining, and contracts = 36 3 Voting failture : social choice in a dictatorial hierarchy = 58 PART Ⅱ MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS = 75 4 Horizontal dilemmas : social choice in a decentralized hierarchy = 77 5 Vertical dilemmas : piece - rate incentives and credible commitments = 102 6 Hidden action in hierarchies : principals, agents, and teams = 120 7 Hidden information in hierarchies : the logical limits of mechanism design = 138 8 Hierarchical failures and market solutions : can competition create efficient incentives for hierarchy? = 159 PART Ⅲ COOPERATION AND LEADERSHIP = 179 9 The possibilities of cooperation : repeated vertical dilemmas = 182 10 The indeterminacy of cooperation : conventions, culture, and commitment = 199 11 The political economy of hierarchy : commitment, leadership, and property rights = 216 Epilogue : politics, rationality, and efficiency = 235 References = 239 Name Index = 247 Subject Index = 250